Don’t trust us. You don’t have to.
Every password manager asks for your trust. SquarePass is built so you never need to give it. We can’t read your passwords. We can’t change who has access. And nobody opens a password without leaving a record.
From €4.99 per user per month, billed annually. Excl. VAT.
Good evening, Anna
You have access to 5 vaults with 243 items in total. Everything here is decrypted in this browser.
A few steps make your account stronger.
Three things we cannot do. By design.
Other vaults protect you as long as the provider behaves. SquarePass protects you when the provider is hacked, pressured or simply wrong.
We can’t read your passwords
They are locked on your own device before they ever reach us. We keep the locked box. You keep the key. A break-in at SquarePass finds nothing anyone can read.
For engineers
Encryption and decryption happen only on member devices. Our servers hold ciphertext and signed records: no keys, no titles, no names, no passwords. Every ciphertext is bound to its place (organisation, vault, item, version and part), so moving it elsewhere makes decryption fail. There is no master key and no general read key. See the architecture.
We can’t decide who gets in
Only your own administrators can, and they sign every change. Your devices check those signatures themselves. If our server ever claims something else, your devices refuse it.
For engineers
Membership lives in a signed, hash-chained log. Each record contains the hash of the previous one, is signed by the proposer and approved by a threshold of administrators that you set. Every client verifies the whole chain and pins the latest record, so a server that omits, rolls back or forks the log is rejected. Try to break the chain yourself.
Nobody can look without being seen
A password is handed over only at the moment someone needs it, and only after that moment has been written into a record that cannot be quietly edited. Try to copy everything at once and the system slows you down, then stops you.
For engineers
The audit trail is a separate service with its own database and its own signing key. A member signs each request; the audit service appends a record and returns a signed receipt; only then does the server release the encrypted secret, and the client verifies the receipt. If the audit service is unreachable, nothing is delivered. A per-member hourly limit warns first and then blocks. See the threat model.
Same attack. Different ending.
Pick a situation and follow what happens in a typical password manager and in SquarePass.
“Zero knowledge” turned out to be a promise, not a guarantee.
Almost every password manager says it cannot see your data. In 2026, researchers put that to the test with one simple question: what if the provider’s server is hacked and starts lying to your app? At three of the leading services, they found a way in. Again and again.
Source: Scarlata et al., Zero Knowledge (About) Encryption, USENIX Security 2026.
SquarePass starts from exactly that scenario. It does not ask your devices to believe the server. It gives them the means to check. See how each attack is closed
From a small team to critical infrastructure.
Teams and companies
Share logins without sharing the risk. You see who opens what, and people who leave take nothing with them.
Organisations under NIS2
The Dutch Cybersecurity Act (Cyberbeveiligingswet) has applied since 15 August 2026. Access control and authentication are among its measures. SquarePass gives you evidence of who can reach what, and who did.
Defence, government, critical infrastructure
Assume breach, need-to-know, four-eyes approval and accountability are enforced by the design, not left to configuration.
Sources: Government of the Netherlands, 15 August 2026 (entry into force); CMS, De Cyberbeveiligingswet, August 2026 (measures).
Your own SquarePass in a few minutes.
Choose a plan, pay by card and receive a one-time setup link. You create your organisation and your keys on your own device. We never have them.
How it works, in plain language.
No cryptography degree needed. Each step has a short explanation, and a closer look for the engineers on your team.
Vaults
Every vault has its own key. Only the members of a vault can open its contents; the server never sees a name or password.
Network Sensitive
64 items · key version 3Finance
31 items · key version 4Infrastructure admin Sensitive
22 items · key version 1Customer portals
118 items · key version 2Private
8 items · key version 1New vault
A shielded collection of passwords with its own key and its own members.The SquarePass web portal, shown with sample data.
What actually happens.
From the first setup to the day someone leaves.
You create your own vault. We never hold the keys.
After you subscribe you receive a setup link that works once. You use it on your own device to create your organisation, your first administrator and your keys. From that moment, only your own signatures decide who gets access.
For engineers
The setup link carries a one-time token that lets you place the first record of your membership chain. After that the endpoint is closed. Every later change must be signed and approved by your administrators.
A password is locked before it leaves your device.
Each item has two parts: a header (title, website, username) so you can search, and the secret itself. Both are locked on your device. What we receive is unreadable.
For engineers
Every item version gets a fresh data key. Header and secret are each encrypted as a whole with XChaCha20-Poly1305 and bound to organisation, vault, item, version and part. The data key is wrapped with the vault key, and the version is signed by the writer.
Opening a password leaves a record first.
The secret is not sitting on every laptop. It is fetched at the moment you show or copy it.
- You sign the request on your device.
- The audit service records it and returns a signed receipt.
- The server hands over the locked secret with that receipt.
- Your device checks the receipt and unlocks it, in memory only.
For engineers
If the audit service cannot be reached, the server delivers nothing. There is no delivery without an audit record. Each request carries a signature over member, vault, item, version, request ID, time and action, so an administrator can verify afterwards that the member really made it.
Your administrators decide who is in. Everyone’s device checks.
Passwords live in vaults. Adding someone to a vault is a signed decision by your administrators, and you choose how many of them must agree.
For engineers
New members and administrators are confirmed with a fingerprint you compare outside the website, by QR code or by reading it aloud. That way the server cannot slip in a key of its own. See the chain in action.
When someone leaves, the locks are changed.
The vault gets a new key straight away and everything in it is locked again under that key. The person who left receives nothing more, not even old versions.
For engineers
Removal starts a new key epoch. An administrator’s client re-encrypts every current item under the new vault key; the rotation can resume after an interruption. Items last written by the departed member that the client has not seen before go into quarantine until an administrator releases them.
Lost a device or forgot your password?
Revoke the device and it is locked out for good. If you turned on passkey recovery, you get back in with your passkey and your password. No administrator can take over your account.
For engineers
Recovery stores an encrypted backup of your keys; opening it takes the passkey and the password. A restored device is read-only until it has confirmed the current head of the chain with another device, so a server cannot talk it into an old state. Auto-lock is configurable per device, from 5 to 240 minutes.
Nothing is ever really deleted.
Deleting creates a new version. Every earlier version stays, and an administrator can restore any of them.
The same item, on your side and on ours.
This is what a break-in at SquarePass would find.
- Title
- Core switch admin
- Username
- netadmin
- Password
- Tulip-Canal-2026!
- Title
- 9f3a61c07be2d4410a5c
- Username
- c41e0b97aa35f2d8
- Password
- 7d02e9b1446fc83a91e05b2c
One stolen password is enough.
Logins are the keys to your organisation. The vault that holds them is the first place an intruder looks.
Source: Verizon, Data Breach Investigations Report 2026.
Everyone says zero knowledge. Ask what happens when the server lies.
Most password managers are safe as long as their own servers behave. SquarePass is built for the day they do not.
Four ways in, and why each one is closed here.
In 2026, researchers tested leading cloud password managers against a server that misbehaves.
Source: Scarlata et al., Zero Knowledge (About) Encryption, USENIX Security 2026.
| Attack class | Why it works elsewhere | SquarePass |
|---|---|---|
| Account recovery | The server takes part in recovery, so a malicious server can get at keys | Recovery is opt-in and needs your passkey and your password. No administrator or server-side recovery key. |
| Sharing | The server says which public keys belong to members, and can slip in its own | Public keys are fixed in a signed chain that every device verifies. New members are confirmed by fingerprint. |
| Item encryption | Fields are encrypted separately, so they can be swapped or stripped | Each part is encrypted as a whole and bound to organisation, vault, item and version. |
| Downgrade | The server offers older or weaker settings and clients accept them | One algorithm suite, no fallback. Clients refuse anything lower than they have seen. |
SquarePass’s protocol rules were written to rule out these classes of attack.
Common practice and SquarePass.
| Topic | Common practice | SquarePass |
|---|---|---|
| Who gets access | The server tells clients who the members are and which keys apply | A signed chain that every device verifies itself |
| On the server | Sometimes per-field encryption, so fields can be swapped | Ciphertext bound to its place; no keys |
| Reading a password | The whole vault syncs to every device; reading leaves no trace | Fetched on use; recorded first, delivered second |
| Bulk copying | Usually no brake | Hourly limit per member: warning, then block |
| Audit trail | Often a log in the same database as everything else | Separate service with its own key; chained records |
| Someone leaves | The vault often keeps the same key | New vault key; every current item is re-encrypted |
| Administrators | Often a recovery route that can take over an account | No master key; admins see only vaults they belong to |
| Downgrades | A server can sometimes offer weaker settings or older protocols | One fixed algorithm suite; anything lower is refused |
| Quantum computers | Data copied today may be broken later | Hybrid key exchange from day one |
| Deleting | A recycle bin that empties after a while | Nothing is permanently deleted; every version can be restored |
Six questions to ask any password manager.
Including this one. Our answers are on the security page.
- Who decides who is a member of a vault: the server, or signatures your own devices verify?
- Is a retrieval recorded before the password is delivered, by a service the main database cannot rewrite?
- Can an administrator, or the vendor, recover or take over an account?
- Can the server make your client use weaker or older cryptography?
- What does a breach of the vendor expose: ciphertext only, or also names, titles and addresses?
- What happens to the vault key when someone leaves?
Built on the assumption that we get breached.
The service is designed so that a compromised server learns nothing useful and can change nothing unnoticed. This page shows how, in enough detail to judge it.
Keys on your side. None on ours.
- Web portal
- Command-line client
- Verify every signature and receipt
ciphertext only
What each part knows
| Part | Knows | Does not know |
|---|---|---|
| Your device | The member’s keys and the plaintext of what they open | Keys of vaults the member does not belong to |
| API server | Item IDs, who fetches which item and when, vault membership | Titles, names, passwords, vault names or keys |
| Audit service | The chain of retrieval and write records | Content |
| Database and backups | Ciphertext, wrapped keys and signed records | Anything usable without the keys on your devices |
Public, well-studied primitives.
We name them because security should not depend on keeping them secret.
| Purpose | Primitive |
|---|---|
| Content encryption | XChaCha20-Poly1305 |
| Key exchange | HPKE with X-Wing (ML-KEM-768 + X25519) |
| Signatures | Ed25519 |
| Password-based key derivation | Argon2id |
| Hashing | SHA-256 |
No home-grown cryptography: vetted libraries pinned to fixed versions, test vectors, and a cross-check against a second implementation. One algorithm suite, no fallback.
Try to break it yourself.
Access rights live in a chain of signed records, like a notary’s register with no removable pages. Play the attacker and watch what a device does.
Simplified example with shortened fingerprints. In SquarePass, SHA-256 and Ed25519 signatures do this work.
Six attacks, and what each one gets.
To read a single password, an attacker needs a registered device of a member, that member’s password and membership of the right vault. Even then, the retrieval is on record before anything is shown.
| Attack | What happens | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Our servers are breached | The attacker finds ciphertext only. Adding members or weakening settings is refused by every device. | Data without keys |
| An insider wants everything | The retrieval limit slows and then blocks. Each retrieval is recorded before the password is visible. | Slowed, blocked, logged |
| Someone erases their tracks | The audit trail sits in a separate service with its own key. Records are chained, so gaps and rollbacks show. | Tampering is evident |
| A member leaves | The vault gets a new key at once and current items are re-encrypted. Older versions are no longer released to them. | Access ends |
| An administrator is coerced | There is no master key. Admins see only their own vaults, and critical changes can require several signatures. | One admin is not enough |
| Quantum computers arrive | Key exchange is hybrid. An attacker has to break both the classical and the post-quantum part. | Two locks, both must fail |
What SquarePass does not promise
- A compromised device sees what its user opens there. That is why SquarePass locks automatically and lets you revoke a device immediately.
- Someone who has seen a password can remember it. After a departure, change the password in the target system too.
- In the browser, the application code comes from our server. For the highest assurance, use the command-line client, and later the native apps.
One price per user. Nothing hidden.
Pay monthly or yearly. Yearly billing gives you two months free. Prices exclude VAT.
Basic
Everything a team needs to share passwords safely.
- Locked on your own devices
- Vaults, sharing, templates and expiry dates
- Signed membership chain
- A record before every retrieval
- Hourly retrieval limit
- New keys when someone leaves
- Full version history
- Web portal and passkey recovery
- One administrator
Pro · recommended
For organisations where no one decides alone.
- Everything in Basic, plus:
- Several administrators who must agree
- Additional signature for critical actions
- “Sensitive” profile: fresh confirmation per retrieval
- Limit increases only with approval
- Command-line client for macOS
Custom
For defence, government and critical infrastructure.
- Technical briefing for your specialists
- Walkthrough of the design and threat model
- Tailored agreements
Basic is €5.99 per user per month, or €59.90 per user per year. Pro is €9.99 per user per month, or €99.90 per user per year. All prices exclude VAT.
Your own SquarePass in a few minutes.
After payment you receive a one-time setup link. With it you create your organisation, your first administrator and your keys on your own device. We never have them.
Straight answers.
Can SquarePass staff read my passwords?
No. Passwords are locked on your devices. Our servers hold no key that opens anything, and there is no master key.
What if SquarePass itself is hacked?
The attacker finds locked data and signed records. They cannot add members, force weaker settings or roll back to an older state: every device checks the chain itself and refuses anything that does not add up.
What if I forget my password?
Turn on passkey recovery. We then store an encrypted backup of your keys; opening it takes your passkey and your password. No administrator can take over your account.
Which devices are supported?
Today: the web portal (Dutch and English) and a command-line client for macOS. Native apps for iOS and macOS and a browser extension are in development.
Which cryptography does SquarePass use?
XChaCha20-Poly1305 for content, HPKE with X-Wing (ML-KEM-768 + X25519) for key exchange, Ed25519 for signatures, Argon2id for the password and SHA-256 for hashing. More on the security page.
How does the setup link work?
It is valid once. You use it to create your organisation and the first record of your chain on your own device. From then on, changes to access need your administrators’ signatures.
Is there a brochure?
Yes, an eight-page brochure in Dutch. Open the brochure.
Let your own specialists judge it.
Request a technical briefing. We walk your team through the chain, the audit trail and the threat model, and answer their questions directly.
- Company
- SquarePass is a product of SquareLab B.V.
- Registered office
- Poststraat 1, 6135 KR Sittard, the Netherlands
- Chamber of Commerce (KvK)
- 91560969
- VAT number
- NL865696068B01